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a part of his alleged deliveries to the job site by signed receipts.
To establish the balance, he called a reconstruction expert to
testify as to the amount of like materials actually used in con-
struction. The court found such testimony "helpful" but insuf-
ficient to establish that the lien claimant had supplied materials
in excess of that reflected by signed invoices.
The supplier further claimed interest at the rate of eight
per cent from date of delivery as stipulated in his agreement
with the contractor. The court refused, pointing out that the
owner was not a party to that contract, and limited the claim for
interest to the legal rate from the date the lien was perfected by
filing.'6
In 1-10, Inc. v. Justice,17 a motel construction job was shut
down and a notice of default recorded by the owner. The general
contractor filed a lien affidavit in the amount of the entire con-
tract price less payment received to date, his claim covering not
only the balance due him but also for "potential or contingent
liability to subcontractors." The Fourth Circuit rejected his
claim that the lien secured contingent claims and ordered a par-
tial erasure to that extent. His notice of suit also claimed that
the "potential or contingent liability to subcontractors" was due
in quantum meruit. This was viewed as a non-contractual claim,
which was not secured by liens created by the PWA.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Due to restricted budgets and corresponding reduction in
pages for printing the LAw REVIEW, these comments are neces-
sarily limited to those which are important and necessary. Under
the circumstances, the more important comments are the critical
ones; this should not be misunderstood as a generalization be-
cause, on the contrary, I find there has been a marked improve-
ment in the way in which civil law problems are being handled
and in the way that opinions are being written. With this ob-
servation, it is hoped that the comments which follow will be
considered seriously and will serve a constructive purpose.
16. See Pringle-Associated Mtg. Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So.2d
502 (1969), for the proposition that the lien claimant's personal right against
the owner does not arise unless and until the lien Is filed.
17. 260 So.2d 89 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
AcQuISITiVE PRESCRIPTION
Doiron v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co.' started as a peti-
tory action and finished with sustaining the defendant's pleas of
ten-year and thirty-year acquisitive prescription. In connection
with the ten-year plea, there was no dispute about the defen-
dant's "possession," and the court made clear and succinct dis-
position of the issues concerning "good faith" and "just title."
In also sustaining the thirty-year plea, the court took a position
on the interpretation of certain Civil Code articles which raises
an important question. Stated generally, when one Civil Code
article incorporates by reference the applicability of provisions
in another article, is this limited to the text of the incorporated
article as it existed when the reference was enacted, or does the
reference also include amendments which were subsequently
made to the article in question?
In the section on thirty-year acquisitive prescription, Civil
Code article 3505 provides that the rules established (in the
preceding section) for ten-year acquisitive prescription "are
applicable to the prescription of thirty years, except in the pro-
visions contained in the present paragraph [section] which are
contrary to or incompatible with them."2 By reason of this in-
corporation by reference, the court treated as applicable the
special rule in article 3478 which permits the running of ten-
year acquisitive prescription against a minor (but to accrue
only when he reaches 22).8 Article 3505 was first enacted as
article 3471 of the Civil Code of 1825 in substantially the same
language which is in the text today. At that time, the text of
article 3442 (RCC 3478) provided for the shorter acquisitive
1. 251 So.2d 506 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), wr4t refuaed, 259 La. 903, 253
So.2d 223 (1971).
2. LA. CIVM Coos art. 3505: "All the rules established in the preceding
paragraph with regard to the prescription of ten years, are applicable to
the prescription of thirty years, except in the provisions contained in the
present paragraph, which are contrary to or incompatible with them."
8. LA. Cv. Coo art. 3478: "He who acquires an Immovable in good faith
and by just title prescribes for it in ten years. This prescription shall run
against interdicts, married women, absentees and all others now excepted
by law; and as to minors this prescription shall accrue and apply in twenty-
two years from the date of the birth of said minor; provided that this pre-
scription once it has begun to run against a party shall not be interrupted
in favor of any minor heirs of said party." (As amended by Acts 1920, No.
161, and 1924, No. 64. The further amendment of this article by Acts 1972,
No. 346 is not relevant to the present discussion.)
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prescription with good faith and just title;4 and article 3488 of
the Civil Code of 1825 provided 5 that prescription does not run
against minors. The qualified deletion of the suspension was
introduced by the 1920 and 1924 amendments of the RCC 3478
and was expressly limited to "this prescription." To say that the
legislators, in the 1920 and 1924 amendments, intended the new
rule to be incorporated by reference for the thirty-year prescrip-
tion, strikes me as unrealistic in fact and erroneous in analysis.
I would therefore conclude that the present article 3505 does not
incorporate by reference the rules in article 3478 on the running
of prescription against minors.
Referring to the general question stated at the beginning of
these comments, I would not say that every incorporation by
reference must be limited to the texts existing at the time of
the incorporating enactment. Each problem may have special
characteristics as a result of the subject matter and the actual
texts involved, and needs to be considered as an individual mat-
ter.
Incidentally, it may be noted that the particular problem
here discussed no longer exists because it has been resolved
legislatively-although badly placed-by the 1958 amendment
to Civil Code article 3541 which provides expressly that the
thirty-year prescription "whether acquisitive or liberative, shall
run against ... minors." However, this provision was not avail-
able for the decision of the case being discussed because the
enactment occurred after the events of the case.
LmF. ATIV PESCRiUIoN
Prescription and Peremption
The time limitation for the exercise of a particular cause
of action may be of two kinds, and it is important to classify
it correctly. If it is an ordinary liberative prescription, it is
subject to the regular rules of interruption and suspension which
interfere with the running of time. However, if it is a peremp-
tion, it is an absolute calendar calculation which brooks no
4. See complete history in COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF Lou-
ISIANA (LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES) art. 3505 (1942). [Hereinafter cited as COM-
PILED EDITION.]
5. With the same text as today in LA. CIV. CODE art. 3522.
6. See Legislative Symposi m: 1958 Regular Session-Property, 19 LA.
L. REV. 65, 71-72 (1958).
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interference with the running of time, and completely extin-
guishes the right whose lifetime has expired. In the case of lib-
erative prescription, even after the lapse of the prescribed time
there remains a natural obligation which has certain legal
effects.7
This distinction is not always understood and identified, and
sometimes the classification is a difficult one depending on the
exact language and intent of the legislative text on which the
determination has to be based. For these reasons, it is important
to note that in the recent case of Ancor v. Belden Concrete Prod-
ucts, Inc.,8 there is a clear statement of this distinction between
ordinary liberative prescription and peremption.
Waiver of Prescription?
First National Bank v. Gaddis was decided correctly on the
basis that prescription was interrupted by the existence of a
valid pledge which is a continuous acknowledgment of the in-
debtedness. However, the opinion also discusses the issue of
whether an express waiver of prescription must be recorded in
order to affect third persons. The purpose of the present com-
ment is to question the concept of a "waiver of prescription."
The court said:
"Our conclusion is that the waiver signed by Mrs. Gad-
dis on March 11, 1965, had the effect of interrupting the
running of prescription on the note, and that it was un-
necessary that that waiver be recorded in the public records,
or that notice of the waiver be given to any third party, in
order to preserve the rights of the holder of the note to fore-
close on the mortgage which secured it."'
Civil Code article 3460 states "[o]ne can not renounce a pre-
scription not yet acquired, but it is lawful to renounce prescrip-
tion when once acquired." Giving up the benefit of prescription
when once acquired is properly called "renunciation" and is the
debtor's valid exercise of a choice which he is authorized to
make. However, giving up the benefit of prescription not yet
7. See previous Sympos4a comments on prescription in 14 LA. L. Rsv.
129-31 (1953); 29 LA, L. Rsv. 230-33 (1969).
8. 260 La. 372, 256 So.2d 122 (1971).
9. 250 So.2d 504, 508 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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acquired would constitute an advance waiver of the right to plead
prescription altogether. The prohibition in article 3460 is in the
nature of a rule of public policy because it expressly takes away
the power of obligating one's self not to plead prescription. In
other words, an advance waiver of prescription is of no legal
effect and should be treated as if it had not been made.'
Louisiana Civil Code article 3460 is a verbatim reproduction
of the French Civil Code article 2220. Planiol states that the
general system of prescription "is justified by the necessity of
establishing a term for the exercise of actions"'" which could
be destroyed if it were possible to waive prescription. Planiol
also adds that "contractual prolongations of prescription are null,
as being equivalent to anticipatory renunciations," and he sums
the topic up in the conclusion that "the organization of prescrip-
tion is a matter of general interest, as to which private agree-
ments should have no effect."' 2 Elsewhere, Planiol says that
"prescription is a matter of public policy."' 8
Baudry-Lacantinerie reiterates the same position in the fol-
lowing statements:
"It is easy to understand why prescription can not be re-
nounced in advance. A rule which would permit it would
be contrary to social interest. It would encourage negligence
and carelessness of title holders. It would go against the
purpose of prescription. 'Prescription,' the expos6 of the
legislative motives states, 'is necessary for the maintenance
of public order. Thus it is part of public law from which
no individual is free to derogate.'
"It is not quite correct to say that prescription is part
of public law; but it is certain that the social interest which
lies at the base of prescription is contrary to allowing free-
dom to renounce it in advance. '14
Reverting to the case being considered, the court's com-
10. See Nabors Oil & Gas Ref. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Co., 151 La. 361,
91 So. 765, 777 (1921).
11. 2 PLANIOL, CIVL LAW TREATISE no. 630 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
12. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 648-49 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
13. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE no. 2712 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
14. 28 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, TRArr TH90RIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CmL no. 53 (4th ed. 1924), in the English translation (of Jaro Mayda)
at 37 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1972).
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ments about waiver of prescription and the issue about whether
such a waiver must be recorded, can be disregarded without
affecting the conclusion which is amply supported by the exis-
tence of a valid pledge. However, it is extremely important to
place the concept of a waiver of prescription in its proper and
more complete context.
Classification of the Cause of Action
As often expressed in previous Symposium comments, 15 the
nature of the claim carries with it the time limitation for its
prescription. Thus a tort claim is prescribed in one year,16 a
secretary's salary in three years,17 a promissory note in five
years,' 8 general contract claims in ten years19 and so forth. A
complication of this problem occurs where a third party pays
the principal obligation and then seeks reimbursement.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cities Service Oil Co.,20
the insurance company paid its insured for damage sustained
and then brought a subrogation suit against the person who was
allegedly liable in tort for the accident. The trial court sustained
the plea of one-year prescription, and this was affirmed on
appeal. The contention that the cause of action was one de in
rem verso (ten-year prescription) was correctly dismissed, not
only because the necessary elements were not present but essen-
tially because the insurer's course of action was the same as
that of the insured's, namely ex delicto.
In LeBlanc v. Big Jim's, Inc.,21 the purchaser of a mobile
home brought a redhibitory action against his vendor, the dealer,
who in turn filed a third party petition against the manufacturer
for indemnification should judgment be rendered against the
dealer. The manufacturer pleaded the one year prescription
against redhibition2 2 which was sustained in the lower court but
15. 20 LA. L. RErv. 235 (1960); 24 LA. L. RV. 210, 211 (1964); 25 LA. L. REV.
352, 355 (1965).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3536.
17. LA. CIV. CODs art. 3538.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540.
19. LA. CIv. CODs art. 3544.
20. 251 So.2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir.); writ refused, 259 La. 879, 253 So.2d
214 (1971).
21. 252 So.2d 181 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
22. LA. Cv. CODE art. 2520.
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dismissed on appeal. The court rejected the classification of this
cause of action as one in redhibition because the dealer no longer
had title to the mobile home and could not tender its return;
also, he could not claim indemnification before being cast in
judgment. Furthermore, the court added that for an action in
indemnification the prescription would be ten years.23
The distinction between these two cases may seem tenuous
and technical with procedural and pleading involvements, but
this should not be surprising because the facts and legal issues
are not necessarily the same in the two separate relationships
out of which the respective causes of action arise. For example,
when a surety pays the principal obligation and then brings suit
against the debtor for reimbursement,24 the nature of his cause
of action arises out of the surety-debtor relationship and is un-
related to the nature of the original claim of the creditor against
the debtor. 25
A controversial problem of classification is the nature of
the cause of action under Civil Code article 66726 for violation
of the sic utere servitude. In Union Federal Savings & Loan v.
451 Florida Corp.,2 7 an action for damages arising out of con-
struction activities on neighboring property was brought under
article 667, and it was classified as ex delicto subject to the one-
year prescription of article 3536. As authority, the court quoted
from the earlier case of Gulf Insurance Co. v. Employers Lia-
bility Assurance Corp.28 as if this answer was obvious and well
settled-which it is not. The Gulf Insurance case was dissected
pretty thoroughly in a well-documented casenote29 which also
discussed the French commentators, and it was again criticized
in the faculty Symposium comments; 0 but neither of these items
is mentioned in the Union Federal case.
As additional authority, two other cases are cited. One is
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544.
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3052.
25. C. Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So.2d 580 (1968),
and Symposium comments in 30 LA. L. REv. 235, 238-39 (1969).
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 667: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate
whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on It, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be
the cause of any damage to him."
27. 256 So.2d 356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
28. 170 So.2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
29. Note, 26 LA. L. REv. 409 (1966).
30. 26 LA. L. Rlv. 536, 538-39 (1966).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the court of appeal opinion in Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co.,31
which does nothing more than cite the Gulf Insurance case on
this point. However, no reference is made to the supreme court
decision8 2 in the Craig case in which the majority opinion re-
ferred to the recent vacillation in the classification of the cause
of action under Civil Code article 667 but found it unnecessary
to pass on that question.8" Furthermore, two justices in a con-
curring opinion stated "it is not an action in tort, as otherwise
indicated by the decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Cir-
cuit, in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp. '8 4 These justices considered the action to be one on a
quasi-contract prescribable in ten years.
The other case cited in Union Federal is Langlois v. Allied
Chemical Corp.85 in which the supreme court justice, who joined
in the Craig case concurring opinion, classified the action under
article 667 as quasi-contract, cited the Craig case as holding the
action ex delicto when actually the Craig majority opinion de-
scribed the issue as controversial and did not pass on the ques-
tion. Furthermore, the majority opinion in the Langlois case
draws a distinction between the cause of action under article
669 (which was there involved) and one under article 667.
Whether such a distinction is warranted is still another issue,
which is not directly pertinent to these comments.
In view of the state of flux in the classification of the cause
of action under Civil Code article 667, the inadequate opinion
in the Union Federal case can not carry much weight and does
not contribute to a clarification or stabilization of the issue.
In conclusion, it is submitted as stated in previous Sym-
posium comments8" that the cause of action under article 667
is neither ex delicto nor ex contractu; neither is it quasi-con-
tract;37 this code provision creates by the operation of law an
obligation and a limitation on property ownership within the
fifth category of the sources of obligations. Obligations arise
31. 202 So.2d 432 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
32. 252 La. 502, 211 So.2d 627 (1968).
33. Id. at 513, 211 So.2d at 631.
34. Id. at 518, 211 So.2d at 633. See Symposium comments in 29 LA. L.
Rsv. 235 (1969).
35. 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971).
36. E.g., 27 LA. L. REv. 436, 438-39 (1967); 26 LA. L. REv. 536, 538-39 (1966);
8 LA. L. Rlv. 234, 236-37 (1948).
37. See LA. CIV. COD art. 2294.
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from (1) contracts, (2) quasi-contracts, (3) delicts, (4) quasi-
delicts, (5) the operation of law.s8 The separate category of obli-
gations "imposed by the sole authority of the laws" is identified
in Civil Code article 2292 which states,
"Certain obligations are contracted without any agree-
ment, either on the part of the person bound, or of him in
whose favor the obligation takes place.
"Some are imposed by the sole authority of the laws,
others from an act done by the party obliged, or in his favor.
"The first are such engagements as result from tutorship,
curatorship, neighborhood, common property, the acquisition
of an inheritance, and other cases of a like nature.
"The obligations, which arise from a fact, personal to
him who is bound, or relative to him, result either from
quasi-contracts, or from offenses and quasi-offenses." (Em-
phasis added.)
Louisiana Civil Code article 2292 comes from Code Napoleon
article 1370 and the French projet.8 9 Article 2292 is the first
article in Title V of Book III, under the general heading "Of
Quasi-Contracts, and of Offenses and Quasi-Offenses" whereas
Code Napoleon article 1370 appears under the heading "Des
engagements qui se forment sans convention" (Of Obligations
which are formed without any agreement) and contains the
following text:
"Certain obligations are formed without any agreement
either on the part of the person bound, or of him in whose
favor the obligation takes place.
"Some result from the sole authority of the law. Others
arise from a fact personal to him who is obligated.
"The first are engagements formed involuntarily, such
as those between neighboring landholders." 40
This classification of the five sources of obligations was
38. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1760, 2292. Cf. QUEBEC CIV. CODE art. 983: "Obli-
gations arise from contracts, quasi-contracts, offenses, quasi-offences, and
from the operation of the law solely."
39. See COMPILED EDITION art. 2292.
40. See COMPILED EDrrioN art. 2292.
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emphasized by Pothier 41 and has been consolidated in France,
Quebec and Louisiana. For some reason, the fifth category-
obligations which arise from the operation of law-is being over-
looked in Louisiana and should be more clearly recognized. On
the issue of the appropriate period for liberative prescription,
it does make a difference.
State Lumber & Supply Co. v. Gill 42 involved a claim against
the owner for supplies furnished on a construction project where
the supplier had not fulfilled all the statutory requirements for
the preservation of his lien against the property. The statute
provides a special one-year prescription for the personal cause
of action against the owner but adds that "this shall not inter-
fere with the personal liability of the owner for material sold
to or services or labor performed for him or his authorized
agent. '48 Thus the court succinctly stated the question on which
depended the classification of the cause of action as "whether
this was a contract job or whether Rousset was hired as an
employee or agent by defendant Gill."' 44 On the evidence, the
court found that Rousset was employed by Gill and therefore
the statutory prescription of one year did not apply. Conse-
quently, the supplier's cause of action was classified as one on
open account subject to the three-year prescription of Civil Code
article 3538.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES
Implied Obligations
The appellate opinion in Baker v. Chevron Oil Co.1 was dis-
cussed in last year's Symposium.2 In that discussion it was noted
that the case suggests the possibility that a lessee might be im-
pliedly obligated to a lessor who has granted a lease on a min-
41. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONs no. 2: "The sources of obligations are contracts,
quasi-contracts, offenses, quasi-offenses; sometimes the law or equity alone."
42. 259 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
43. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (1950).
.44. 259 So.2d 639, 641 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
* Professor of Mineral Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 245 So.2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
2. Symposium, 32 LA. L. REv. 254, 261 (1972).
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